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The recurrent crisis in corporate governance has led to periodic reviews of corporate 
governance codes of best practice in most developed countries.  These codes tend to 
recommend the same set of executive remuneration policies.  The Cadbury and 
Greenbury reports issued in the UK in 1992 and 1995 respectively have been the most 
influential.  This study finds that the language of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports 
have been perpetuated through subsequent regulations (e.g. codes of best practice) and 
companies’ annual reports in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (UK).  The 
language consists of phrases such as ‘attract, motivate and retain’, ‘fair and competitive’ 
and ‘align interests’ which collectively are supposed to explain or justify executive 
remuneration.  These explanations of executive remuneration are consistent with notable 
academic theories such as human capital, market and agency theory.   
 
This paper studies the influence of regulations on the disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports in Australian, New Zealand and the UK.  In comparing the disclosure of 
companies in their 1998 and 2007 annual reports, the content analysis reveals that the 
disclosure became homogeneous and consistent with the regulations in Australia and the 
UK, but not in New Zealand. As there are few regulations in New Zealand related to 
executive remuneration, it is not surprising that the amount of voluntary disclosure in 
New Zealand companies’ annual reports has been minimal.  These findings support 
institutional theory’s notion of institutional isomorphism: Normative pressure transmitted 
the language (or discourse) of executive remuneration from academia to practice; 
Coercive pressure has compelled companies to adopt this language in their annual 
reports; Mimetic pressure has reinforced this pattern in disclosure.   
 
The coercive pressure of regulation has been the most influential on companies’ 
disclosure behaviour.  Australian and UK regulations have adopted a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach to their corporate governance codes of best practice.  As many directors’ and 
executives’ associations have been involved with the writing of these regulations, it is not 
surprising that companies have willingly adopted the language within the regulations. 
While the explanations of executive remuneration within this language (or discourse) are 
individually compelling, as a set of explanations there are conflicts, inconsistencies and 
ambiguities. It has long been argued that one-size does not fit all, yet a ‘boilerplate’ 
approach to executive remuneration policy has emerged.  The institutionalisation of the 
discourse of executive remuneration has been bad for practice because it provides boards 
of directors with a seemingly credible defence against challenges to their executive 
remuneration practices and has led to homogeneity in disclosure. 
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1.0 Introduction  
“I succumbed more than I should have to the two favourite siren songs of 
American CEOs. First, if your company has performed brilliantly, then you 
should pay your top people brilliantly.  However, if your company has 
performed poorly, you can’t afford to make people suffer very much, 
because they will simply leave and go elsewhere; in other words, you have 
to keep good people.  Simple logic, of course, mandates that there can be 
very few effective people at the top of a lousy-performing organization.  But 
simple logic was apparently not my forte.  As a result, I helped create the 
phenomenon we see today: huge and surging pay for good performance, and 
huge and surging pay for bad performance, too.” (Crystal, 1991, p.11) 
 
In his book, In Search of Excess, Graef Crystal (1991) described how compensation consultants 
justified executive remuneration to boards of directors, shareholders and society.  There are many 
logics used to justify executive remuneration which can be found in the press releases and annual 
reports of companies (Zajac and Westphal, 1995), the corporate governance codes of best practice 
of countries (Point and Tyson, 2006) and the journal articles of academics (St-Onge et al., 2001).  
For example, the agency logic asserts that incentives are required to align the interests of executives 
with those of shareholders, whereas the human resources logic asserts that remuneration is needed 
to attract and retain scarce managerial talent (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Legitimacy theory 
(Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2006) contends that these remuneration logics are used to 
confer legitimacy on organisations, particularly the boards of directors as they have to justify or 
explain their decisions to shareholders and society.   
 
Logics consist of one or more statements designed to persuade, convince or influence the opinion of 
others.  The logics used to justify executive remuneration (hereinafter, remuneration logics) can be 
classified as rhetoric (see Larson, 2004 for a review of rhetoric analysis).  In the classical sense, an 
orator uses rhetoric to persuade the audience of the correctness of their argument.  The focus of this 
study is on the rhetoric within texts rather than speeches.  Corporate governance codes of best 
practice, commissioned reports on executive remuneration, hard regulation such as laws and soft 
regulation such as listing rules (hereinafter, regulations) contain remuneration logics designed to 
convince companies to adopt certain executive remuneration practices.  Annual reports also contain 
remuneration logics designed to convince shareholders and society that the companies’ executive 
remuneration practices are legitimate.   
 
This research is concerned with how regulators and companies use remuneration logics to explain 
executive remuneration practices. Content analysis is used to examine the remuneration logics 
within texts from three countries, namely Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  These countries are 
similar in many respects due to their historical economic and political ties.  However, the amount of 
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regulation and the size of the companies across these countries are quite different.  Regulations 
published between 1991 and 2008 from these three countries are examined.  Annual reports from 
the largest 50 listed companies in 1998 and 2007 from each of these three countries are also 
examined.  The research traces the origins of the most prominent remuneration logics in these texts 
and the diffusion of these remuneration logics over time.  Initially this research focused on the 
global financial crisis occurring in the early 2000s as exemplified by the Enron scandal and how the 
changes in subsequent regulations influenced the reporting behaviour of companies in Australia, 
New Zealand and the UK.  However, the scope of the research was expanded to include earlier 
regulations, particularly the influential Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports in the UK1.   
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.147) asked “What makes organizations so similar?” Their answer 
was institutional isomorphism in the form of three pressures: normative, coercive and mimetic.  
These pressures influence organisations, particularly when organisations undergo change.  A 
financial crisis can be a catalyst for organisational change.  Shareholders and others will often 
blame the boards of directors and executives of companies for the financial crisis as well as seeking 
out alternative ways thinking and organising.  So existing logics may be discarded and replaced 
with new or previously unpopular logics.  For example, the independence of directors and the 
separation of chair and CEO have increased in popularity due to the Enron scandal.  Regulators 
(e.g. securities commission) will often commission reports into the causes of financial crises and 
issue new regulations to prevent reoccurrences. These regulations are likely to be entrenched in 
popular (normative) logics. In order to defend their legitimacy, companies may imitate other 
(successful) companies, adopt (changing) social norms or comply with (new) regulations.   
 
Institutional theory asserts that organisations risk loosing their legitimacy if they do not conform to 
isomorphic pressures.  However, organisations “are also capable of responding to these influence 
attempts creatively and strategically” (Scott, 2008, p.178).  Isomorphic pressures are not always 
homogeneous, do not necessarily change rapidly and are not outside the influence of organisational 
actors.  For example, Sir Richard Greenbury was both the Chair and CEO of UK retailer Marks and 
Spencer and the Chair of a commissioned report on directors remuneration (Greenbury, 1995).  
Companies may be able to manipulate the public’s mood for change in their favour, which leads to 
the reinforcement of the status quo, rather than any meaningful changes.  Similarly, companies may 
decouple the remuneration logics espoused in their annual reports from the underlying reality of 
their executive remuneration practices.  While institutional theory asserts that organisations will 
                                                 
1 While regulations are examined from 1991 to 2008, the annual reports of companies are only examined in 1998 and 
2007 because of time constraints and unavailability of annual reports prior to 1995.  
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conform, legitimacy theory asserts that there are many reasons why organisations may choose to 
conform (Deegan, 2006).  Firstly, the conformity may be an illusion as the organisations have 
manipulated the isomorphic pressures so that they do not have to change.  Secondly, the conformity 
may be symbolic in that the organisation’s outside appearance is decoupled from its underlying 
reality. Thirdly, the conformity may be substantive as the organisation changes its practices.   
 
In comparing the disclosure of companies in their 1998 and 2007 annual reports, this study found 
that the amount of disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies is much lower than 
that of Australian and UK companies as comparatively the New Zealand environment has been 
relatively devoid of regulations.  The contents of the disclosure in the companies’ annual report has 
converged over time and become increasingly consistent with the regulations.  However, the high 
degree of homogeneity in the disclosure of companies limits its meaningfulness.  Institutional 
theory explains these patterns: Normative pressure, such as academics advocating the merits of 
agency theory, has transmitted many of the remuneration logics from theory to practice; Coercive 
pressure in the form of homogeneous regulations have compelled companies to use a standard set of 
executive remuneration policies; Mimetic pressure as companies copy their peers has reinforced the 
standard set of executive remuneration policies.  Consistent with legitimacy theory, companies have 
managed these isomorphic pressures by, for example, having their representatives on the 
committees which establish regulations.  It has long been argued that one-size does not fit all, yet a 
“boilerplate” approach to executive remuneration policy has emerged.  
 
This research contributes to institutional theory, legitimacy theory and discourse analysis.  Studies 
in corporate governance have often not linked regulations with the reporting behaviour of 
companies (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008).  Further, studies of executive remuneration policy have sought to determine the antecedents 
and effects of disclosure practices (e.g. Zajac and Westphal, 1995 and Wade et al., 1997), rather 
than the institutional causes for the change in reporting behaviour.  Also, Phillips et al. (2004) 
expressed concern than discourse has not been adequately considered in studies of 
institutionalisation.  These limitations are addressed in this research as it explains how regulations 
and the annual reports of companies have changed over time, particularly how they have responded 
to financial crises.  Moreover, the comparative analysis of Australia, New Zealand and the UK 
shows how institutions and organisations in different environments respond to global events.  
Finally, this research shows how companies strategically manage isomorphic pressures (Oliver, 
1991) and symbolically manage their legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
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Instead of investigating the level of executive remuneration or the structure of executive 
remuneration, this research takes a novel approach by examining the remuneration logics used to 
justify executive remuneration practices in regulations between 1991 and 2008 as well as the 1998 
and 2007 annual reports of companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  The paper is 
organised as follows.  First, the most prominent remuneration logics within these texts are defined 
and discussed.  Second, a model of the process of the institutionalisation of these remuneration 
logics is developed.  The remaining sections include the research method, findings, discussion and 
conclusion.     
 
2.0 Justifying Executive Remuneration Practices 
A pilot study was undertaken to determine the breadth of logics used to justify executive 
remuneration practices.  Several annual reports of companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK 
were analysed.  While many remuneration logics were identified, only the most popular 
remuneration logics were included in this research (see table 1). 
 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
 
The central premise of this research is that the remuneration logics used in practice are consistent 
with and perhaps derived from academic theories and philosophies.  Academics have theorised 
about how academic theories influence practice (see Sturdy, 2004 for a review) as well as lamenting 
about the apparent gap between research and practice (Baldridge et al., 2004 and Tushman et al., 
2007).  Keynes (1936, p.383) argued that “Madmen [sic] in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”  He believed that the 
ideas of economists and philosophers have a greater influence on those in practice than the motive 
of self-interest.  Barley et al.’s (1988) research challenges this idea as it found that academics 
altered their research to match practice, rather than practitioners2 altering their decisions to match 
theory.  However, academic research has certainly influenced practitioners (Sturdy, 2004); for 
example, Porter’s (1980; 1985) competitive strategy and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
theory have been highly influential in the academy and practice.    
 
In light of recent corporate scandals in the US (e.g. Enron and Worldcom) and elsewhere (e.g. HIH 
in Australia, Parmalat in Europe), academics have questioned whether academic theories and 
philosophies have been a positive or negative influence on business and society (Englander and 
                                                 
2 The term “practitioner” is used rather loosely here. It incorporates everyone who are not academics, e.g. policymakers, 
investors, directors, executives, etc. 
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Kaufman, 2003; Ghoshal, 2005; Osterloh and Frey, 2003; Frey and Osterloh, 2005).  Ghoshal 
(2005, p.75) argues “Many of the worst excesses of recent management practices have their roots in 
a set of ideas that have emerged from business school academics over the last 30 years.”  He is 
particularly critical of liberalism and agency theory.  Further, there is growing concern than agency 
theory may be self-fulfilling in practice (Arce, 2007; Cohen and Holder-Webb, 2006; Ferraro et al, 
2005; Cassidy, 2002; Madrick, 2003).  That is, by acting on the assumption that individuals are self-
interested, boards of directors may alter the behaviour of executives as the use of incentives may 
crowd-out executives’ sense of duty and crowd-in their sense of self-interest (Miller, 1999; Frey 
and Jegen, 2001). 
 
Certainly, academics are engaged in training students who are/become practitioners and 
disseminating their research amongst other academics and practitioners.  However, academics are 
also influenced by practice. Inductive methods rely on drawing theories from observation.  Further, 
some academics were/are practitioners and vice-versa.  This research does not assert that all 
theories of executive remuneration were formulated independently of practice, or that the 
remuneration logics contained within regulations and annual reports were exclusively drawn from 
academic theories.  Drawing on institutional theory (Scott, 2008), this research proposes that the 
dissemination of academic theories and philosophies through discourse (e.g. education and 
publication) create normative pressures amongst practitioners.  But these normative pressures may 
not be harmonious as academics may be disseminating competing theories (e.g. agency theory vs. 
stewardship theory, see Davis, et al. 1997).  The following discussion tentatively relates the 
remuneration logics (examined in this research) to a variety of academic theories and philosophies.  
 
The human resources logic (Zajac and Westphal, 1995; or corporate logic, Zajac and Westphal, 
2004) argues that the level and form of executive remuneration must be sufficient to attract and 
retain high calibre managerial talent.  This logic is consistent with a number of theories.  Human 
capital theory asserts that the skill level of employees determines their remuneration (Becker, 
1964).  That is, offering above average pay will attract above average executives, assuming that the 
skill level of executives is observable.  Similarly, managerialist theory (Chandler, 1962) and 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) assert that executives are a scare and 
valuable resource which have unique knowledge and expertise, and it is necessary to pay executives  
to retain their skills.  While stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) also argues that 
executives are a resource to be retained, it contends that individuals are motivated by both extrinsic 
(e.g. money) and intrinsic rewards (Davis et al., 1997).  However, the literature on the human 
resources logic is predominately concerned with extrinsic rewards (e.g. money).  Thus, financial 
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economists do believe that individuals motivated by money are also self-interested (Jensen et al, 
2004). 
 
Consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1983), the agency logic is 
concerned with how to manipulate the self-interest of executives and align their interests with those 
of the shareholders.  As shareholders cannot contract ex-ante for all eventualities and monitor 
executives without incurring considerable cost, incentives (e.g. share options) are believed to be the 
most efficient form of control over executives.  As mentioned above, this may lead to a self-
fulfilling prophecy as in the absence of incentives executives may not act self-interestedly (Miller, 
1999; Ghoshal, 2005).  The agency logic presents a caricature of the behaviour of individuals.  It 
does not account for other motives such as sentiment, duty and excellence (Rocha and Ghoshal, 
2006).  Following the agency logic can lead executives to maximise short-term profit, rather than 
long-term shareholder value, as well as to ignore the interests of stakeholders3.  To overcome these 
problems, Jensen et al. (2004) argues that incentives should be designed so that executives consider 
stakeholders as the means to the end of shareholder value; that is, enlightened self-interest.  
However, the agency logic (as it is presented in practice) is silent on these issues and implicitly 
endorses narrow self-interest (e.g. short-termism). 
 
The pay-for-performance, contribution and achievement logics are performance logics (Wade et al., 
1997).  They assert that executive remuneration schemes should link remuneration to performance.  
The pay-for-performance logic has its roots in scientific management (Taylor, 1911), which 
advocates that employees be rewarded for improvements in productivity.  For executives, a variable 
pay philosophy means being rewarded for improvements in shareholder value (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1992).  Individualism or meritocracy (Young, 1958) is the underlying assumption; 
that is, an executive can influence firm performance.  Similarly, the central proposition of the theory 
of the firm (Coase, 1937) is that “managers of an enterprise guide its activities in such a way as to 
maximize the monetary well-being of its owners” (Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970, p.710).  This 
assumption is embodied in the contribution logic; that is, individuals should be rewarded for their 
contribution to firm performance.  Also, the achievement logic emphasises the need to reward the 
achievement of specific performance objectives (e.g. strategic and financial).  This echoes Locke’s 
(1967) goal-setting theory; that is, individuals find setting and having goals to be motivational.  But 
as Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) point out, goals are most effective when linked to rewards.  
 
                                                 
3 While the term “stakeholders” normally includes shareholders, here they are treated as a separate group.  Thus, 
stakeholders include employees, communities, customers, government, etc. 
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The market logic asserts that there is a managerial labour market and market forces (of supply and 
demand) determine the level and form of remuneration in this market; that is, executives must be 
paid competitively.  This logic is consistent with market theory (Smith, 1776; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992) as St-Onge et al. (2001, p.258) explains “The labor market is composed of firms and 
employees with no one having undue influence… All positions are open and filled in a competitive 
manner… Market forces determine compensation levels.”  However, the managerial labour market 
may not be as efficient and effective as the market logic contends.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2006) 
argue that executives have captured the remuneration committees of companies.  Khurana (2002; 
and Pick, 2005) argues that boards of directors do not act rationally when they hire new CEOs.  
Interlocking directorships mean that remuneration committees are unlikely to penalise CEOs 
without risking penalising themselves (Davis et al., 2003).  Essentially, the invisible hand of the 
managerial labour market is really translucent and somewhat under the influence of CEOs. 
 
The fairness and appropriate logics are seemingly similar as remuneration that is fair is also 
appropriate, but this is an over-simplification.  The fairness logic is concerned with executive 
remuneration being fair, equitable, reasonable and not excessive.  Consistent with equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), it contends that the distribution of remuneration among employees should be 
equitable.  However, the evidence shows that the remuneration of CEOs is many times greater than 
employees (Mishel et al., 2007).  Conversely, the appropriate logic argues that executive 
remuneration should be contingent on the firm’s circumstances and the level of the executive’s 
responsibility.  This logic is consistent with contingency theory (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992; 
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and the managerial discretion hypothesis (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987).  Thus, the fairness and appropriate logics are quite different. 
 
Embodied in the motivation logic is the underlying assumption in most of the aforementioned logics 
that money motivates individuals to maximise their effort.  Money is an effective motivator when 
short-term productivity is the goal (e.g. fruit picking).  However, as expectancy theory explains, 
there are many factors that influence the effort of individuals (Vroom, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 
1968).  In determining how much effort to exert, individuals judge whether increased effort will  
lead to increased performance, whether increased performance will lead to increased rewards and 
the desirability of the rewards offered (see Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002 for a review).  The 
motivation logic presents a caricature of human behaviour.  Individuals respond differently to the 
same incentives due to personalities and circumstances, and rate money as a motivator differently 
(see Furnham, 2005 for a review).  Notably, executives tend to be well above the average in terms 
of wealth, which mitigates the effect of monetary incentives (Furnham, 2005).   
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The consultant logic suggests that external remuneration consultants should advise boards of 
directors (or remuneration committees) on the CEO remuneration packages in order to ensure 
objectivity.  Since the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal, corporate governance reforms have 
emphasised the need to have independent directors (Cosenza, 2007).  Independent remuneration 
consultants are also advocated (Crystal, 1991).  Agency theory also argues that remuneration 
consultants should be independent so that the remuneration committee’s decisions are impartial 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  Legitimacy theory asserts that external verification of executive remuneration 
practices confers legitimacy on boards of directors (Wade et al., 1997).  However, Crystal (1991) 
highlights that remuneration consultants are often hired by the CEO, or when hired by the board of 
directors, remuneration consultants will give favourable reviews of the CEO so that their 
consultancy firm is hired by the CEO to advice on remuneration for the whole company.   
 
These remuneration logics are normative statements about how boards of directors should 
remunerate their executives.  This leads to conflicts or inconsistencies when multiple remuneration 
logics are employed.  For example, a CEO of a firm experiencing declining performance according 
to the pay-for-performance logic will receive declining pay, but the market logic may dictate that 
the CEO could earn more elsewhere so their pay should not decline and the human resources logic 
argues that a highly skilled CEO should be retained and compensated accordingly.  Indeed, CEO 
pay is more highly related to firm size than firm performance (Becht et al., 2007; Jensen et al., 
2004; Murphy, 1999).  There is also a conflict between the fairness logic and the other logics.  For 
example, the fairness logic conflicts with the agency logic as it asserts that only executives and 
shareholders interests need to be aligned because employees are viewed as a resource to be 
exploited; the alternative view is stakeholder theory (Alam, 2006; Smith, 2003).  It may be that the 
users of these remuneration logics (e.g. executives) are not concerned with potential inconsistencies 
because the remuneration logics are used as a discursive device to confer legitimacy, rather than a 
reflection of the users’ personal believes (Wade et al., 1997).   
 
The next section discusses how these remuneration logics may become institutionalised. 
 
3.0 Institutionalisation: Crisis, Regulation and Reporting 
Drawing on new institutional sociology, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that institutional 
isomorphism in the form of normative, coercive and mimetic pressures influence organisations to 
change (see diagram 1).  These pressures steer organisations towards common ideologies and 
adaptations.  So as organisations change become they increasingly similar (Moll et al., 2006; Scott, 
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2008).  Normative pressures are shared beliefs, values or expectations and are often shaped by 
academia, professions and consultants.  For example, Ghoshal (2005) argues that business schools’ 
advocacy and teaching of liberalism (e.g. agency theory) has lead to firms to widely adopt share 
options schemes.  Coercive pressures are rules or laws and are often shaped by governments and 
their proxies (e.g. the UK’s Financial Reporting Council).  For example, Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2004) found that stock exchanges and governments have issued a number of corporate 
governance codes of best practice in the 1990s.  Mimetic pressures are organisational adaptations 
that become widely used and are often shaped by organisations sharing knowledge (e.g. employees 
moving between firms) and making comparisons with other organisations (e.g. benchmarking; 
industry standards).  For example, the organisational adaptations (e.g. total quality management) of 
financially successful companies are often copied by financially unsuccessful companies in order to 
improve financial performance (Heugens and Lander, 2007). 
 
--- Insert Diagram 1 here --- 
 
Normative, coercive and mimetic pressures are also subject to change.  Institutions which shape 
these pressures are influenced by other institutions and organisations.  Bringing about institutional 
isomorphism necessitates that one pressure dominates the other pressures or there is harmony 
between the pressures.  For example, shareholder value maximisation is the dominant corporate 
objective, particularly in US companies despite the advocacy by many academics of stakeholder 
value maximisation (Smith, 2003; Jensen et al., 2004).  Shareholder value maximisation cannot be 
deinstitutionalised while there is still much academic debate on which of shareholder theory and 
stakeholder theory is best (see Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; Freeman et al., 2004).   
 
Greenwood et al. (2002) described the stages of institutional change.  Firstly, destabilising 
institutionalised practices requires “precipitating jolts”, which are events such as social upheaval, 
technological disruptions or regulatory change.  Secondly, “deinstitutionalisation” occurs when new 
or existing actors “introduce new ideas and thus the possibility of change” (p.60).  Thirdly, “pre-
institutionalisation” occurs when “organisations innovate independently” (p.60) and this transforms 
new ideas into viable new practices.  Fourthly, “theorization” about the new practices is required to 
pick a winner among the new practices.  Actors theorise about what were the causes of 
organisational failure, how the new practices may overcome these causes and how the best of the 
new practices is morally or pragmatically superior to the others.  Fifthly, “diffusion” of new best 
practice occurs as actors accept the theorised justifications and begin to objectify the new best 
practice.  Sixthly, “re-institutionalisation” occurs when the new best practice becomes taken-for-
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granted and gains cognitive legitimacy, although some new best practices become fads and fashions 
and thus not fully institutionalised.  
 
This research is concerned with discursive practices (i.e. the remuneration logics), rather than 
technical practices (e.g. total quality management).  Phillips et al.’s (2004) discursive model of 
institutionalisation complements Greenwood et al.’s (2002) stages of institutional change.  Phillips 
et al. (2004) note that institutions change through discourse as technical practices are embedded in 
discourse.  As discourse is socially constructed from texts, they argue that new texts can alter 
discourse and changes in discourse lead to changes in institutions.  Further, precipitating jolts can 
lead to the production of new texts which either defend the legitimacy of existing practice or 
advocate institutional change.  For texts to become part of an organisational field’s discourse, the 
text must be fit with the other texts that constitute the discourse and must be diffused amongst a key 
group of actors. 
 
The discourse of executive remuneration is embodied in regulations and companies’ annual reports 
(i.e. texts).  This research investigates how this discourse has changed over time.  Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) and Enrione et al. (2006) found that precipitating jolts (e.g. financial crises 
or corporate scandals) lead to the production of new regulations.  It is proposed that the new 
regulations will become part of the discourse if they are consistent with existing regulations.  This 
will lead to greater coercive pressure on companies to conform to the recommendations of the 
regulations. However, companies may attempt to manage this coercive pressure by manipulating it 
or strategic managing their disclosure behaviour.  To manipulate the coercive pressure, companies 
and their representatives may lobby the issuers of the regulations or they may be the issuers.  To 
strategically manage the coercive pressure, companies may either symbolically or substantively 
comply with the regulations.   
 
4.0 Method 
This research investigates how remuneration logics are used to explain or justify executive 
remuneration practices in regulations and companies’ annual reports.  Drawing on institutional 
theory, the influence of the coercive pressure of regulation on companies’ annual reports is 
examined.  Drawing on legitimacy theory, the ability of companies and their actors (e.g. directors 
and executives) to manage this coercive pressure and their companies’ legitimacy is also examined.  
Enrione et al. (2006) found that financial crises lead to new regulations, but they did not study how 
these regulations influenced companies’ disclosure behaviour.  This research examines how the 
changes in regulations in Australia, New Zealand and the UK influence the disclosure behaviour of 
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each of their largest 50 listed companies.  The changes in regulations pertaining to executive 
remuneration are examined from 1991 to 2008.  The contents of the companies’ annual reports in 
1998 and 2007 are also examined.  The focus of this research is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and the remuneration logics used to explain their remuneration.  Content analysis is used to 
determine which remuneration logics are used, when they are used and how often. 
 
4.1 The Sample 
Initially all regulations related to corporate governance from New Zealand, Australia and the UK 
were identified and obtained.  Textbooks (e.g. Du Plessis et al., 2005; Farrar, 2001; Mallin, 2007; 
Solomon, 2007) and websites (e.g. the European Corporate Governance Institute’s, 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php) helped identify the relevant regulations.   If available, 
electronic copies (e.g. pdf) of the regulations were obtained so that the texts could be easily 
searched.  Hard copies of some regulations were also obtained. 98 texts were gathered and 
scrutinised.  Texts were discarded if they were not related to executive remuneration (e.g. the Smith 
report (2003) on audit committees), except New Zealand’s listing rules (issued in 1994, 1999 and 
2003).  These texts were included because the lack of guidance on executive remuneration in New 
Zealand is a significant finding and is highlighted by the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s silence on 
the matter.  In the end, 39 texts are included in the sample and these were issued between 1991 and 
2008 (see table 2). 
 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
 
The sample of companies is not random.  It includes the 50 largest companies in terms of market 
capitalisation that were listed on Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE) on 31 December 1998 and 2007.  Market 
capitalisation information was obtained from newspapers (The Times, London; The Australian; 
National Business Review, New Zealand) and the websites of the stock exchanges.  The largest 50 
companies were selected because they are the most likely to disclose information about their 
executive remuneration policies and practices.  As legitimacy theory contends, companies that are 
heavily publically scrutinised will use disclosure (e.g. in annual reports) to defend or legitimise their 
decisions (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2006).  And the largest companies are publically 
scrutinised more heavily, particularly their CEO pay, than the smallest companies (Ogden and 
Watson, 2008).   
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The annual reports for the 50 largest companies across three counties and two time periods were 
gathered.  Electronic or hard copies were obtained from the companies’ websites, Global Reports 
(www.global-reports.com), NZX Deep Archive Service and University libraries (including 
University of Canterbury, University of Sydney and Strathclyde University).  As the 1998 and 2007 
lists of companies are quite different and to allow intra-company comparisons, the 1998 annual 
reports of the companies on the 2007 list were also gathered4.  Thus, there are two samples (see 
table 3): firstly, the ‘Top50’ sample included 297 annuals reports (only 3 are missing); secondly, the 
‘Continuous’ sample included 293 annual reports (only 2 are missing).  There are more companies 
on the 1998 continuous list than the 2007 continuous list because many companies merged in 
between periods and all of the pre-merger companies are included on the 1998 continuous list.  For 
example, Astra AB (Sweden) merged with Zeneca Plc (UK) in 1999 to form AstraZeneca. 
 
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
 
4.2 The Data  
Descriptive data on the sampled companies were gathered from online sources (e.g. stock exchange 
websites) and their annual reports.  The descriptive data included industry classification, location of 
the companies’ headquarters and countries in which in the companies are listed, as well as market 
capitalisation, revenue, net profit after tax, total assets (opening and closing), net assets (opening 
and closing), dividend per share, return on assets (net profit after tax / average total assets), return 
on equity (net profit after tax / average equity) and debt-to-equity (total closing debt / total closing 
equity).  The three stock exchanges used different industry classification schemes.  These schemes 
were cross-coded against The Times’ industry classification scheme, and the data for the 
companies’ industry classification were recoded accordingly.  Other descriptive data, such as share 
price and board characteristics, were excluded from the sample due to time and cost constraints. 
 
Data on the companies’ executive remuneration practices were also excluded from the sample.  The 
pilot study revealed that the CEOs of the largest companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK 
have similar remuneration packages.  Typically, the CEO’s remuneration package includes a salary, 
an annual (cash) bonus, share options and shares.  The incentives are usually contingent upon 
strategic, financial and market performance objectives.  However, the exact details of these 
performance measures are not always disclosed due to their commercially sensitive nature, 
particularly in New Zealand companies’ annual reports.  Between 1998 and 2007, there did not 
                                                 
4 The lists of companies included in the sample are available upon request from the author. 
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appear to be much change in executive remuneration practices, although there was shift from share 
options to alternative equity based schemes (see Hall and Murphy, 2003).  Since there would have 
most likely been limited variation between companies and over time in the executive remuneration 
practices employed, there would be no significant correlation with the remuneration logics 
employed.  While some remuneration logics should be correlated with some executive remuneration 
practices (e.g. the agency logic and share options), this research does not examine how companies’ 
justify the adoption of executive remuneration practices (see Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Wade et 
al., 1997).  Instead, this research is concerned with how the use of remuneration logics has changed 
over time, particularly in response to financial crises and new regulations. 
 
The pilot study revealed 10 prominent remuneration logics.  Content analysis was used to detect the 
presence or absence of these remuneration logics in the regulations and companies’ annual reports 
(see Bryman and Bell, 2003, Chapter 9).  Each of the remuneration logics were coded 1 (present) or 
0 (absent) for each of the texts included in the sample.  A coding instructions document was 
produced to ensure that the content analysis was reliable and repeatable.  The instructions included 
definitions, examples and keywords associated with the remuneration logics (see tables 1 and 4). 
 
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
 
The remuneration logics within the regulations and companies’ annual reports were not always 
easily identified.  Often significant portions of the texts had to be read and re-read, although 
electronic keyword searches increased the speed and accuracy of the process. In the companies’ 
annual reports, the remuneration policies were usually located in the corporate governance 
statement, directors’ report, or notes to the financial statements, but were occasionally located in 
other sections.  When phrases related to the CEO and their remuneration were identified the phrases 
were scrutinised in order to determine whether or not the phrases embodied one or more 
remuneration logics.  The coding instructions provided clear guidelines for coding these phrases as 
either present or absent.  The data were recorded on coding sheets.  To be coded as present, phrases 
needed to be related to one or more remuneration logics and related to the CEO.  It was critical to 
determining the role of the CEO as some are the managing director and others are the chief 
executive.  Further, some phrases (e.g. in the companies’ remuneration policies) did not apply to the 
CEO but applied to, for example, non-executive directors or employees.  Keyword searches 
revealed many different uses of the keywords (see table 4) which were not consistent with the 
corresponding remuneration logic.  The phrases within the text were only coded as present if they 
were consistent with the remuneration logics.   
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All of the coding of the regulations and companies’ annual reports was carried out by the author.  
To ensure that the coding was reliable and repeatable, the author recoded a sample of 4 regulations 
and 10 annual reports.  Only a few errors were detected.  The recoded data were almost identical to 
the original data.  Further, two research assistants were employed to analyse the contents of 10 
annual reports.  The research assistants were post-graduate students.  They were given an hour 
briefing on the coding process as well as the coding instructions to read after the briefing.  Before 
they began coding, the author met with the research assistants to ensure that they understood the 
idiosyncrasies of the coding process.  The coding sheets of the research assistants were compared 
with the author’s coding sheets, and there was a high degree of similarity.  However, one of the 
research assistants coded the agency logic as present many more times than the other two coders.  A 
meeting with the research assistant revealed that she had misinterpreted the coding instructions.  
After this research assistant revised the coding of the agency logic, the three coders’ data were 
almost identical.  
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
This research focused on identifying trends in the use of remuneration logics in regulations and 
companies’ annual reports.  The data were stored, sorted and analysed using Microsoft ExcelTM and 
SPSSTM.  The analysis of the data was simplistic.  The average and standard deviations were 
calculated for all of the variables.  For the companies, differences between the groups (e.g. 1998 vs. 
2007; listed in one vs. multiple countries; high vs. low users of remuneration logics) were tested 
and significance levels were scrutinised.  Also, correlations between remuneration logics and the 
other variables were calculated and significance levels were scrutinised.  Further, regression 
analyses between the remuneration logics (dependent variables) and the other variables such as 
return on assets (independent variables) were calculated and significance levels were scrutinised.  
However, much of data analysis yielded statistically insignificant results (e.g. the regression 
analyses) and these results are not included in the findings.  Comparing the average use of 
remuneration logics in regulations and companies’ annual reports between countries yields the most 
interesting and significant findings. 
 
4.4 Limitations 
There are three significant limitations of the method employed.  Firstly, the time period studied for 
companies is limited by the availability of their annual reports.  Companies’ websites and the 
Global Reports database do not include many annual reports prior to 1998.  Also, the cost of 
obtaining photocopies of annual reports from overseas universities is prohibitively expensive. 
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Future research could expand the time period under study to include companies’ annual reports 
prior to early regulations such as the Bosch (1991) and Cadbury (1992) reports.  Secondly, the 
sample was truncated as only the largest 50 companies were included.  This non-random sample 
limits the analysis.  It is assumed that firm size is related to disclosure behaviour, but this cannot be 
proved without expanding the sample.  Thirdly, the number of variables studied is limited.  The 
antecedents of remuneration logics require further investigation. 
 
5.0 Findings 
The findings are presented below.  The descriptive statistics highlight the differences between the 
largest 50 companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  While there are significant size 
differences, the companies’ performance across the three countries is comparable.   The issuers of 
regulations and their motivation to issue new regulations are described.  Consistent with other 
studies (e.g. Enrione et al., 2006) corporate scandals are the main motivator for creating new 
regulation.  The content analysis of the regulations and annual reports reveals that the remuneration 
logics are used extensively in Australia and the UK, but not in New Zealand.  Correlation analyses 
are presented on the relationships between the remuneration logics, and the relationships between 
remuneration logics and the financials of the companies.  Also, differences between companies 
listed in one country and multiple countries are examined.  These analyses highlight the influence of 
regulation and firm size on the use of remuneration logics.      
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sampled companies operate in a wide variety of industries (see table 5).  The banking and 
finance industry in all three countries contains the highest number of companies.  The industry 
classification data reflects the idiosyncrasies of the three countries.  However, there are few 
statistically significant correlations between industries and remuneration logics5.   
 
--- Insert Table 5 here --- 
 
The majority of the largest 50 companies listed on the ASX, NZX and FTSE in both 1998 and 2007 
also have their headquarters in that country (see table 6).  It is also common for the largest 50 
companies to be listed on multiple stock exchanges (see table 7).  While there are many dual listings 
of companies on the ASX and NZX, Australian companies are more likely to be in the NZX Top50 
than New Zealand companies are to be in the ASX Top50.  Many Australian and New Zealand 
                                                 
5 The results of this analysis are not reported here. 
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companies are also listed on overseas stock exchanges, but few are large enough to be in the FTSE 
Top50.  The Top50 on each stock exchange and in each time period can be divided into two groups 
fairly evenly: Companies listed on one stock exchange and companies listed on multiple stock 
exchanges, although UK companies have shifted towards multiple listings by 2007.  It is likely that 
there are significant differences between these two groups as companies listed on multiple 
exchanges will face more regulatory and investor scrutiny than those listed on one exchange.  The 
differences between these two groups are analysed later. 
 
--- Insert Table 6 here --- 
--- Insert Table 7 here --- 
 
The financial statistics highlight while New Zealand’s largest companies are much smaller than 
Australia’s largest companies, both of these countries’ largest companies are much smaller than the 
UK’s largest companies (see table 8).  The financial statistics are presented in the local currency, 
but the New Zealand dollar has the least value and the UK pound has the most value in both 1998 
and 2007, which reinforces the size difference.  The performance of Australia’s, New Zealand’s and 
the UK’s largest companies is comparable, although the UK’s largest companies are more highly 
leveraged than Australia’s and New Zealand’s which also distorts their return on equity.  The 
performance of all companies in 2007 is much higher than in 1998, perhaps reflecting the effects of 
the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998) and the recent global economic boom (2002-2007).  The 
relationship between the financial statistics and remuneration logics are discussed later. 
 
--- Insert Table 8 here --- 
 
5.2 The Issuers of Regulations and Their Motivation to Issue Regulation 
Australian institutions have produced at least 18 regulations on executive remuneration between 
1991 and 2007 (see table 9a and 9b).  Du Plessis et al. (2005) suggests that the early regulations, the 
Bosch (1991, 1993 and 1995) and Hilmer (1993 and 1998) reports, have been largely forgotten and 
overshadowed by subsequent developments.  The Bosch reports were produced by collaboration 
between many institutions, whereas the Hilmer reports were produced by the Sydney Institute (a 
privately funded think tank).  These reports were produced in response to “the excesses of the 
1980s”, court decisions and overseas developments in corporate governance (e.g. Cadbury, 1992).   
 
The Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA, formerly AIMA) and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors (AICD) have both periodically produced many reports on executive 
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remuneration, usually in the form of corporate governance codes of best practice.  These reports 
were motivated by a range of factors, particularly high profile corporate collapses and changes in 
Australia’s corporate law.  Similarly, the Horwath (2002) report and Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (CLERP) Act (2004) were motivated by high profile corporate collapses.  These 
include HIH, Harris Scarfe, Ansett and OneTel (see Du Plessis et al., 2005). 
 
The issuers most involved in producing regulations are the professional associations (22%), the 
directors’ association (15%), the fund managers’ association (12%), the financial services 
association (12%), and the stock exchange (10%).  However, the involvement of these issuers has 
been somewhat sporadic between 1991 and 2007.  More recently, the stock exchange, the directors’ 
association and investors’ association have produced the most regulations.  Given that corporate 
collapses are the most cited reason for producing regulations and that issuers are also related to the 
corporate collapses (e.g. directors), the issuers are acting to defend their legitimacy. 
 
--- Insert Table 9a here --- 
--- Insert Table 9b here --- 
 
New Zealand institutions have not produced many regulations on executive remuneration and are 
typically produced by one issuer (see table 10).  Table 10 overstates the number of regulations as 
the NZX’s (formerly, NZSE) three editions of listing rules do not include any recommendations of 
substance regarding executives’ remuneration.  Except for the 2004 edition which states that “2.6 
Every Issuer should have a formal and transparent method to recommend Director remuneration 
packages to shareholders. [And] 2.7 Directors are encouraged to take a portion of their 
remuneration under a performance-based Equity Security compensation plan…”  Further, the two 
reports of the NZ Securities Commission are part of the same report.  Thus, New Zealand 
institutions only produced 7 regulations on executive remuneration between 1991 and 2007. 
 
The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) reports and the NZ Securities 
Commission report were motivated by the financial crisis of 2000-2002, particularly the Enron and 
Arthur Anderson debacle.  NZICA was most certainly defending its legitimacy in its reports.  For 
example, NZICA (2003a, p.1) stated that “The working group did not find any evidence of 
systematic reporting failure in New Zealand. Nor did time working group consider reporting failure 
of the magnitude found in the United States likely in New Zealand at this time.”  These reports were 
part of NZICA’s strategy to reassure the public that the New Zealand companies were not affected 
by the financial crisis.  But New Zealand has not been immune to corporate governance problems.  
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For example, the partial re-nationalisation of Air New Zealand in 2001; the profit warnings of 
Vertex in 2002; the receivership of Feltex in 2006; the collapse of many finance companies in 2006, 
2007 and 2008 (Stock, 2008). 
 
--- Insert Table 10 here --- 
 
UK institutions produced many regulations between 1991 and 2008, but only 9 are concerned with 
executive remuneration (see table 11).  The early reports were motivated by corporate scandals and 
the perception that directors were overpaid, whereas the later reports were part of a periodic review 
process. The stock exchange (16%) and stock exchange regulator (26%) as well as professional 
associations have been involved in producing the majority of regulations.  The Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), a business association, has also been involved with two significant reports, 
Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) which lead to the Combined Code.  The Combined Code is 
significant as listed companies must comply with it or explain why they do not comply.  It uses 
many of the remuneration logics.  The CBI represents 200,000 British companies including 80% of 
the FTSE100 companies (www.cbi.org.uk).  Thus, UK companies are self-governed in the sense 
that many of their directors have served on the committees which produced the regulations on 
executive remuneration. 
 
--- Insert Table 11 here --- 
 
The most common issuer of regulations in Australia, New Zealand and the UK are professional 
associations, which are predominately institutes of chartered accountants.  Directors, executives and 
business associations have also been common issuers.  Stock exchanges and their regulators have 
been common issuers in the UK, but not Australia and New Zealand.  Further the majority of these 
regulations have been produced in response to both local and international corporate scandals.  The 
issuers are defending their legitimacy by issuing regulations and manipulating the isomorphic 
pressures by setting the regulations which they must adhere to. 
 
5.3 The Use of Remuneration Logics in Regulations and Annual Reports 
Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 and the UK’s Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 
both require companies to include a remuneration report in their annual report which explains their 
remuneration policies.  However, the remuneration logics are almost absent from these regulations.  
Instead, the remuneration logics are found in the ASX’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations (2003 and 2007) and the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) 
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The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998, 2003, 2006 and 2008).  For example, both 
codes include the fairness logic (ASX, 2007, p.35: “Remunerate fairly and responsibly”; FRC, 
2006, p.21, “The total rewards potentially available should not be excessive.”).  However, both 
codes do not mandate that the remuneration logics within the codes must be included in companies’ 
remuneration reports and both codes do not prescribe how these principles (in the form of 
remuneration logics) should be implemented in practice.  Both countries have adopted a principles-
based or a ‘comply or explain’ approach; that is, companies are free to design and explain their 
executive remuneration practices as they see fit, but they must disclose their executive remuneration 
policies and practices.  New Zealand regulations are almost nonexistent in comparison to Australia 
and the UK. 
 
Given the different regulatory environments in Australia, New Zealand and the UK, the use of 
remuneration logics in regulations is not surprising (see chart 1).  In the UK, the Cadbury (1992) 
report contains 4 remuneration logics, the Greenbury (1995) report contains 9 and the Combined 
Code (1998) contains 7.  All of the regulations in the UK contain multiple remuneration logics and 
there is an upward trend in the use of remuneration logics between 1991 and 2008.  In Australia, the 
Bosch (1991; 1993; 1995) and Hilmer reports (1993; 1998) averaged 2.2 remuneration logics, 
whereas the regulations produced by AICD, IFSA and ASX between 2000 and 2007 averaged 7.1 
remuneration logics.  The upward trend in the use of remuneration logics is more pronounced in 
Australia than in the UK.  In New Zealand, the NZICA (2002; 2003a; 2003b) reports averaged 2.3 
remuneration logics, the Securities Commission (2004) report included 6, and the NZ Shareholders’ 
Association (2004) web-article included 4, and the Institute of Directors’ (2005) code included 7.  
While chart 1 shows an upward trend in the use of remuneration logics for New Zealand, 
regulations in New Zealand did not include any remuneration logics until 2002.  
 
--- Insert Chart 1 here --- 
 
The same trends in the use of remuneration logics in regulations are found in the largest 50 
companies’ annual reports in Australia, New Zealand and the UK (see chart 2).  Companies’ annual 
reports contained on average the following remuneration logics: in the UK, 6.5 in 1998 and 8.2 in 
2007; in Australia, 3.4 in 1998 and 8.7 in 2007; and in New Zealand, 0.9 in 1998 and 3.6 in 2007.  
Companies in all three countries experienced an upward trend in the average use of remuneration 
logics, particularly Australia.  New Zealand lags behind Australia and the UK in the use of 
remuneration logics in both regulations and annual reports.  In 1998, there is a clear gap between 
Australia and the UK, but in 2007, Australia and the UK are at comparable levels.  However, 
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whether the increased volume of disclosure has had any other benefits (e.g. increased stock market 
efficiency) is indeterminable. 
 
--- Insert Chart 2 here --- 
 
Each of the remuneration logics has increased in usage between 1998 and 2007 in both regulations 
and annual reports in all three countries (see table 12).  Once a remuneration logic is included in a 
regulation or an annual report, subsequent editions of the regulation or annual report also include 
the remuneration logic; that is, it was rare for an issuer or a company to stop using a remuneration 
logic once it was adopted.  For the remuneration logics used in the largest 50 companies’ annual 
reports, the most used are the pay-for-performance, market and human resources logics, whereas 
the least used are the appropriate, contribution and fairness logics.  While the fairness logic is used 
extensively in the regulations of all three countries, it rates consistently as the least used 
remuneration logic in the companies’ annual reports in all three countries.  The results show that 
companies favour those logics which justify increasing remuneration; for example, the market logic 
implies that pay should be competitive and Jensen et al. (2004) points out that no one wants to have 
below average remuneration, so companies set their remuneration levels to be consistent with the 
upper quartile of comparable firms or increase the average by altering the comparator group.   
 
--- Insert Table 12 here --- 
 
The increase in the number of remuneration logics used per company is significant (see table 13).  
In Australia, in 1998 36% of companies used 0-2 remuneration logics and 6% used 8-10, whereas in 
2007 0% used 0-2 and 80% used 8-10.  In New Zealand, in 1998 81% of companies used 0-2 
remuneration logics and 2% used 8-10, whereas in 2007 44% used 0-2 and 14% used 8-10.  In the 
UK, in 1998 2% of companies used 0-2 remuneration logics and 29% used 8-10, whereas in 2007 
2% used 0-2 and 72% used 8-10.  The change in the use of remuneration logics between 1998 and 
2007 is most pronounced amongst Australia companies with all companies using at least 6 
remuneration logics.  In 2007, UK companies had not adopted as many remuneration logics as 
Australian companies, but the two groups are not significantly different as only one UK company 
had less than 6 remuneration logics.  The findings indicate that Australian and UK companies have 
responded to the financial crises and subsequent regulations by adopting the language of the 
regulations.  After the Greenbury (1995) report was issued, a reporter for the Financial Times, Jim 
Kelly (1996, p.13) commented “Greenbury requires a statement of remuneration policy and E&Y 
found that the dreaded accountants’ disease – known as “boilerplate” – had taken hold. Time and 
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time again, companies’ rewards policy was designed to “attract, retain and motivate”, a phrase 
hijacked from the Greenbury report itself.”  The findings indicate that the “boilerplate” disease is a 
consequence of regulation.  Variation in the executive remuneration policies of Australian and UK 
companies greatly diminished between 1998 and 2007. 
 
--- Insert Table 13 here --- 
 
Table 12 shows that the sample of Top50 and the sample of Continuous companies use the 
remuneration logics to the same extend; there are no statistically significant differences between 
these two groups.  However, the sample of Continuous companies is eclectic as a result of mergers 
and acquisitions between 1998 and 2007.  To determine whether stable companies change their 
remuneration policies, a sub-sample containing only those companies which were continuously 
listed and that do not make any major acquisitions between 1998 and 2007 was constructed.  The 
differences in means between 1998 and 2007 are analysed (see table 14).  The findings show that 
stable continuously listed companies in all three countries used the remuneration logics to the same 
degree as less stable companies.  
 
--- Insert Table 14 here --- 
 
5.4 The Relationships between the Remuneration Logics 
Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that there was a negative correlation between the use of the 
agency and human resources logics in US companies from 1976 and 1990.  This research analyses 
the correlations between the remuneration logics below. 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics for Australian companies in 1998 and 2007 reveals 
few statistically significant results (see tables 15 and 16).  A number of the correlations are 
incalculable because some of the remuneration logics are used by no companies (the fairness logic 
in 1998) or all companies (the pay-for-performance and market logics).  The results indicate that no 
statistically significant relationships between the remuneration logics persist over time, except for 
the correlation between the human resources and the consultant logics (0.364** in 1998 and 
0.393** in 2007; ** p<0.01).  This result is consistent with Crystal’s (1991) concerns that 
remuneration consultants are not independent, but favour the CEO.  There are no statistically 
significant negative correlations. 
 
--- Insert Table 15 here --- 
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--- Insert Table 16 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics for New Zealand companies in 1998 and 2007 
reveals many statistically significant results (see tables 17 and 18).  Only the correlation between 
the fairness logic and the other remuneration logics in 1998 is incalculable as no companies use the 
fairness logic.  83% of the correlations in 1998 and 67% in 2007 are statistically significant, which 
is the most of the three countries.  63% of the correlations in 1998 persist in 2007.  There are no 
negative correlations.   Many of the correlations between the fairness logic and the other 
remuneration logics in 2007 are not statistically significant, except the human resources and market 
logics.   
 
--- Insert Table 17 here --- 
--- Insert Table 18 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics for UK companies in 1998 and 2007 reveals very few 
statistically significant results (see tables 19 and 20).  Only the correlation between the market logic 
and the other remuneration logics in 2007 is incalculable as all companies use the market logic.  
The results indicate that no statistically significant relationships between the remuneration logics 
persist over time.  There are no statistically significant negative correlations. 
 
--- Insert Table 19 here --- 
--- Insert Table 20 here --- 
 
The results from the correlations between remuneration logics highlight the difference between 
heavily regulated (Australia and the UK) and unregulated (New Zealand) countries.  While 
regulations in Australia and the UK do not mandate that companies include the remuneration logics 
in their annual reports, the regulations may as well because the coercive pressure created by the 
regulations leads companies to adopt the remuneration logics.  There are almost no statistically 
significant correlations between the remuneration logics amongst Australian and UK companies 
because the coercive (regulatory) pressure crowds-out any relationships that might have otherwise 
existed.  Conversely, in the absence of regulation in New Zealand, there are many statistically 
significant relationships between remuneration logics and these generally persist over time.  
Amongst New Zealand companies, the relationships between the human resources, contribution, 
achievement, market, appropriate and motivation logics are the strongest and most persistent.  
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Perhaps, in an unregulated environment, these companies which adopt these remuneration logics are 
more efficient that those that do not (this is investigated further below). 
 
5.5 The Relationships between Remuneration Logics and the Financials 
The correlations between remuneration logics and the financials for Australian companies in 1998 
and 2007 reveal few statistically significant results (see tables 21 and 22).  Correlations between the 
fairness logic and the financials in 1998 are incalculable as no companies use the fairness logic.  
Also, correlations between the pay-for-performance and market logics and the financial in 2007 are 
incalculable as all companies use these remuneration logics.  Only 14% of the correlations in 1998 
and 6% of the correlations in 2007 are statistically significant.  None of the statistically significant 
correlations persist over time.  There are only two statistically significant negative correlations.  The 
consultant logic is negatively correlated with both return on assets (-0.204 in 1998; -0.336* in 2007, 
p<0.05) and return on equity (-0.023 in 1998; -0.322* in 2007, p<0.05).  Crystal (1991) argues that 
remuneration consultants work for the benefit of the CEO, rather than shareholders.  These 
correlations support this premise as poor firm performance is related to using consultants to justify 
executive remuneration. 
 
--- Insert Table 21 here --- 
--- Insert Table 22 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics and the financials for New Zealand companies in 
1998 and 2007 reveals many statistically significant results (see tables 23 and 24). Correlations 
between the fairness logic and the financials in 1998 are incalculable as no companies use the 
fairness logic.  39% in 1998 and 71% in 2007 of the correlations are statistically significant, 
although 26% of the statistically significant correlations in 1998 have dissipated in 2007.  The 
correlation between net profit after tax and the agency logic is negative in 1998 (-0.513***; 
p<0.001), but is positive in 2007 (0.454**; p<0.01); this result is yet to be explained.  The 
consultant logic is negatively correlated with return on assets in 1998 (-0.310*; p<0.05), but this 
statistically significant correlation dissipates in 2007.  The relationship between the remuneration 
logics and firm performance is weak.  A firm size effect explains the statistically significant 
correlations.  Larger companies are more likely to disclose their remuneration policies because they 
have more resources available to prepare the annual report and they are more visible in the public 
eye (i.e. they need to legitimise their executive remuneration practices). 
 
--- Insert Table 23 here --- 
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--- Insert Table 24 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logic and the financials for the UK companies in 1998 and 
2007 reveals very few statistically significant results (see tables 25 and 26).  Correlations between 
the market logic and the financials in 2007 are incalculable as all companies use the market logic.  
8% in 1998 and 6% in 2007 of the correlations are statistically significant.  None of the statistically 
significant correlations in 1998 are also present in 2007.  There are several statistically significant 
negative correlations.  In 2007, the consultant logic is negatively correlated with return on assets (-
0.312*, p<0.05). 
 
--- Insert Table 25 here --- 
--- Insert Table 26 here --- 
 
The results indicate that regulations crowd out any relationships between the remuneration logics 
and the financials of the companies.  Regulation creates a coercive pressure and Australian and UK 
companies have responded by adopting the remuneration logics.  In New Zealand’s relatively 
unregulated environment, there is a stronger relationship between the use of remuneration logics 
and the financials of the companies. However, in Australia in 1998 there was also relatively limited 
regulation, yet there was not a strong relationship between the use of remuneration logics and the 
financials of the companies.  Alternatively, the results indicate a size threshold effect.  That is, when 
companies reach a certain size (e.g. by market capitalisation), they become more visible in the 
public eye and need to legitimise their executive remuneration practices.  In New Zealand, the size 
of the largest 50 companies varies much more than in Australia and the UK.  Thus, the statistically 
significant results are highlighting the difference between the large and small companies in New 
Zealand.   
 
5.6 The Differences between Companies Listed in One Country and Multiple Countries 
To further examine the size threshold effect, the differences between countries listed in one country 
and multiple countries are analysed (see table 27).  The results show that there are few statistically 
significant differences between Australian and UK companies that are listed on one or more stock 
exchanges, although in 2007 the Australian companies listed on multiple stock exchanges are 
somewhat larger than those listed on one.  Further, the results show that New Zealand companies 
listed on multiple stock exchanges have statistically significantly higher average use of the 
remuneration logics (6 out of 10 in 1998; 8 out of 10 in 2007).  This highlights the coercive 
pressure created by country-specific regulations.   
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--- Insert Table 27 here --- 
 
6.0 Discussion 
Enrione et al. (2006) found that corporate scandals were the precipitating jolts that lead to the 
adoption of new corporate governance codes.  However, the newness of these regulations and their 
influence on disclosure behaviour was not studied.  This research found that new regulations in 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK did not contain new remuneration logics.  Instead, the language 
of the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports are embedded in subsequent regulations.  
There have been many precipitating jolts throughout the 1990s and 2000s, but they have not lead to 
the creation of new ideas and practices.  The effect of the financial crises has been to entrench the 
existing discourse of executive remuneration in regulations and companies’ annual reports.   
 
The discourse of executive remuneration has been scantly studied.  Previous research has found that 
companies use remuneration logics to legitimise their executive remuneration practices (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1995; Wade et al., 1997).  This research found that the discourse of executive 
remuneration used in regulations is also used in companies’ annual reports.  The main reason for the 
homogeneity is that the issuers of the regulations are professional, directors’ and business 
associations, which have an interest in producing company-friendly regulations.  Consistent with 
legitimacy theory, Australian, New Zealand and UK companies bolster their legitimacy by 
seemingly conforming to coercive pressure. 
 
A “boilerplate” approach to executive remuneration policy has emerged.  Companies’ annual 
reports use a plethora of remuneration logics to justify their executive remuneration practices.  
These remuneration logics are seemingly unchallengeable; for example, investors are unlikely to 
question an executive remuneration policy that is designed to align the CEOs interest to those of the 
investors.  The remuneration logics are rhetoric designed to convince shareholders and other 
stakeholders of the efficacy of companies’ executive remuneration policies.  The findings show that 
the “boilerplate” has been increasingly entrenched in companies’ annual reports over time.  The  
“boilerplate” of remuneration logics is bad for practice (Ghoshal, 2005) as it crowds out variation.   
 
Interestingly, the fairness logic which is included in many of the regulations is the least used 
remuneration logic.  The fairness logic is, however, inherently ambiguous as fairness is not defined.  
It is not clear whether fairness is concerned with comparisons, for example, between CEOs and 
employees, or other criteria.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
This research studied the use of remuneration logics in regulations and companies’ annual reports in 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  The findings indicated that new regulations are produced in 
response to financial crises and corporate scandals.  Further, the issuers of these regulations include 
stock exchanges, stock exchange regulators, professional associations, directors’ associations, 
business associations, fund managers’ associations and investors’ associations.  These regulations 
often include remuneration logics, which originated in the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) 
reports.  UK companies’ annual reports in 1998 and 2007 include to high degree these remuneration 
logics.  While Australian regulations have adopted these remuneration logics, they were not 
extensive used until the early 2000s.  Consequently, Australian companies’ annual reports in 1998 
did not include many remuneration logics, whereas in 2007 they included the same amount of 
remuneration logics as their UK counterparts.   The UK and Australian regulations require 
companies to disclose their executive remuneration policies and have adopted a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach to their corporate governance codes of best practice.  And generally UK and Australian 
companies will comply and have adopted the language of executive remuneration contained within 
the regulations.   
 
In contrast, there have been few New Zealand regulations until recently and these regulations have 
not included many of the remuneration logics.  Consequently, New Zealand companies do not 
disclose much information about their executive remuneration policies, although the information 
that is disclosed does include the remuneration logics.  The findings suggest that in the absence of 
regulation, there is a size threshold for the disclosure of executive remuneration policies.  That is, in 
New Zealand there is a strong correlation between firm size and the use of the remuneration logics.  
Also, New Zealand companies which are listed in multiple countries tend to disclose more than 
those listed in New Zealand only. 
 
The executive remuneration policies of Australian and UK companies have become increasingly 
homogenous over time.  The findings are consistent with institutional isomorphism, particularly 
coercive pressures.  Firstly, normative pressure transmitted the discourse of executive remuneration 
from academia to practice.  This is evidenced by the high degree of similarity between the 
remuneration logics used in regulations and companies’ annuals reports, and the academic theories 
and philosophies related to executive remuneration.  Secondly, coercive pressure has compelled 
companies to adopt this discourse in their annual reports.  This is evidenced by the leader-follower 
pattern as companies’ disclosure in their annual reports has significantly increased after new 
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regulations have been issued, but note that the regulations do not mandate that companies use the 
remuneration logics.  Thirdly, mimetic pressure has reinforced this pattern in disclosure.  This is 
evidenced by the time lag in companies adopting the remuneration logics. It takes several years 
after the regulations have been issued for the majority of companies to adopt the remuneration 
logics as some companies take a ‘wait and see’ approach.   
 
The regulations do not mandate that companies use the remuneration logics, yet many companies in 
Australia, New Zealand and the UK do.  The findings indicate that directors’ associations, business 
associations and (to a lesser extent) executives’ associations have had significant input into the 
production of the regulations on executive remuneration.  Since these groups have had a degree of 
control over the regulation (i.e. the coercive pressure), it is not surprising that companies have 
adopted the language of the regulations.  Thus companies have managed their legitimacy by 
quelling public anxiety about executive remuneration by complying with regulations and disclosing 
remuneration logics designed to convince the public (including shareholders) of the legitimacy of 
their executive remuneration practices.  
 
Future research should investigate the companies’ use of remuneration logics in more depth.  
Firstly, the relationship between firm and board characteristics, executive remuneration practices, 
the use of remuneration logics and firm performance should be investigated.  In order to determine 
whether the use of remuneration logics is associated with increased efficiency and whether firms 
decouple their executive remuneration policies from their executive remuneration practices.  
Secondly, archival analyses which trace the adoption of remuneration logics in academic 
publications, regulations, news media publications and companies’ annual reports will provide 
further evidence on how normative pressures develop and whether academia has significantly 
influenced the language of executive remuneration.  Thirdly, interviews with executives, directors, 
investors and other institutional actors will provide evidence on whether the remuneration logics are 
entrenched in the beliefs of these actors.  That is, are the remuneration logics confined to 
regulations and annual reports (symbolic meaning) or do these actors use the remuneration logics to 
justify their beliefs and decisions in practice (substance meaning).   
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Tables 
 
Remuneration 
Logics 
Explanations or Justifications Related Theories and Philosophies 
Human 
Resources 
High performing executives are a 
scarce resource, which makes their 
remuneration more costly than other 
employees. Thus a high level of 
remuneration is necessary to attract and 
retain high calibre managerial talent. 
Managerialist Theory (Chandler, 
1962); Stewardship Theory (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991); Resource 
Dependency Theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978); Human Capital 
Theory (Becker, 1964) 
Agency Incentives are necessary to align the 
interests of the CEO with those of the 
shareholders. 
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1983) 
Pay for 
Performance 
The remuneration of executives should 
rise and fall with firm performance. 
 
Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911); 
Variable Pay Philosophy (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 1992) 
Contribution Individuals should be rewarded for 
their contribution to firm performance. 
Meritocracy (Young, 1958); Theory of 
the Firm (Coase, 1937; Baker, 1939; 
Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970) 
Achievement Individuals should be rewarded for the 
achievement of specific performance 
objectives.  
Goal Setting Theory (Locke, 1968) 
Market Market forces (of supply and demand) 
determine the level and form of 
remuneration.  As executives can move 
freely between companies, a 
competitive remuneration package is 
necessary. 
Market Theory: Classical Economics 
and the Invisible Hand (Smith, 1776); 
Neoclassical Economics (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992) 
Fairness Executive remuneration should be fair, 
equity, reasonable and not excessive. 
Equity Theory (Adams, 1965) 
Appropriate Executive remuneration should be 
appropriate given the firm’s 
circumstances and the level of 
managerial responsibility. 
Contingency Theory (Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992; Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998); Managerial 
Discretion Hypothesis (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987) 
Motivation Executives are most effectively 
motivated using monetary incentives.  
Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964; 
Porter and Lawler, 1968) 
Consultant External remuneration consultants 
advise boards of directors in order to 
ensure objectivity when setting 
executive remuneration packages.  
Legitimacy Theory (Wade et al., 1997); 
Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Table 1: The Logics Used to Justify Executive Remuneration Practices 
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Institutional Isomorphism
Company
External
Advisors
Competitors
Regulators
Professional
Bodies
Academics
Shareholders
Normative 
Pressure
Coercive Pressure
Mimetic 
Pressure
 
Diagram 1: The Institutional Landscape 
 
Country 1991-1997 1998-2006 2007-2008 Total 
Australia 5 11 2 18 
New Zealand 1 10 0 11 
United Kingdom 2 7 1 10 
Total 8 28 3 39 
Table 2: Number of Regulations in the Sample 
 
Country Top50-1998 Top50-2007 Continuous-1998 Continous-2007 
Australia 50 50 48 46 
New Zealand 48 50 45 40 
United Kingdom 49 50 65 49 
Total 147 150 158 135 
Table 3: Number of Annual Reports of Companies in the Sample 
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Remuneration 
Logics 
Examples from Annual Reports Examples from Regulations Keywords 
Human 
Resources 
“The company’s remuneration strategy aims to attract, 
retain and motivate high calibre employees…” 
(Fletcher Building Ltd, 2007, p.46) 
“Boards and remuneration committees must have 
flexibility to offer the packages required to attract, 
retain and motivate people of the calibre and 
experience they need to make their companies 
successful” (Greenbury, 1995, para. 6.5) 
Attract; retain; select; 
secure; or recruit 
Agency “The company believes this shareholding strengthens 
the alignment of senior executives with the interests of 
shareholders and puts their own remuneration at risk 
to long-term company performance.” (Fletcher 
Building Ltd, 2007, p.49) 
“A key concern should be to ensure, through the 
remuneration system, that Directors share the 
interest of shareholder in making the company 
successful.” (Greenbury, 1995, para. 6.16) 
Align or link; 
interests or rewards; 
and CEO and 
shareholders 
Pay for 
Performance 
“Remuneration will incorporate, to a significant 
degree, variable pay for performance elements, both 
short term and long term focussed…” 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 1998, p.126) 
 
“A significant proportion of executive directors’ 
remuneration should be structured so as to link 
rewards to corporate and individual performance.” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2006, para. B.1) 
Pay for performance; 
performance based; 
variable; or at risk 
Contribution “…and where each is well rewarded for their 
contribution to the success of the business.” 
(Sainsbury, 1998, p.i) 
 
 
“If a part of executive directors’ remuneration is 
related to entity performance over time, their efforts 
are more likely to be focused on making a 
contribution to future investor returns rather than 
only on short term gains” (New Zealand Securities 
Commission, 2004, p.25) 
Contribute; influence; 
effort; merit; impact; 
or delivery 
Achievement “In 1998 the bonus scheme was structured such that 
the bonus payable was equal to 10% of basic salary for 
the achievement of budgeted EPS targets and 20% for 
the achievement of more stretching EPS targets.” 
(British Aerospace, 1998, p.34) 
“Schemes involving performance bonuses or profit-
sharing can assist in the growth of shareholder 
value by focussing employees on the achievement 
of key short-term individual and collective goals.” 
(New Zealand Institute of Directors, 2005, para. 
3.8) 
Achieve 
Table 4a: Examples of and Keywords associated with the Remuneration Logics 
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Remuneration 
Logics 
Examples from Annual Reports Examples from Regulations Keywords 
Market “Executive Directors’ salaries are reviewed each year 
by the Committee and adjusted to reflect the 
performance and the competitiveness of salaries 
relative to the market.” (British Aerospace, 1998, 
p.34) 
“Remuneration as a whole must be reasonable and 
comparable with market standards…” (Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, 2000, para. 5.2) 
Competitive; market; 
comparable; or peers 
Fairness “For 2007, the Committee is looking at ways of 
operating the existing remuneration framework in line 
with the following key principles: …and • reward 
performance on a fair and equitable basis.” 
(Sainsbury, 2007, p.37) 
 
 
“Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly” 
(ASX, 2007, p.35) 
Fair; reasonable; 
equitable; or not 
excessive 
Appropriate “Also, the Committee recognises the need to structure 
remuneration packages to incentivise and reward an 
appropriate balance between long and short term 
performance. (British Aerospace, 1998, p.32) 
“Equity-based remuneration has limitations and can 
contribute to ‘short-termism’ on the part of senior 
executives. Accordingly, it is important to design 
appropriate schemes.” (ASX, 2007, p.36) 
Appropriate 
Motivation “These enhancements aim to strengthen the motivation 
of executives to produce superior performance.” 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2007, p.52) 
“Remuneration for directors should be set at levels 
designed to attract, motivate and retain the best 
people available.” (New Zealand Institute of 
Directors, 2005, para. 3.13) 
Motivate or 
incentivise 
Consultant “Directors are satisfied that they have received 
independent advice that this constitutes an appropriate 
remuneration package for the role of chief executive 
officer.” (Fletcher Building Ltd, 2007, p.45) 
“The committee may need to draw on outside 
advice. This should combine quality and judgement 
with independence.” (Greenbury, 1995, para. 4.17) 
Independent or 
external; and 
consultants or 
advisors 
Table 4b: Examples of and Keywords associated with the Remuneration Logics 
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Industries Australia 
– 1998 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand 
– 1998  
New 
Zealand 
– 2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
Banking & Finance 9 11 6 5 14 11
Investment Companies 2 2 5 4 0 0
Construction & Property 5 5 5 8 0 1
Consumer Goods 5 3 5 2 5 7
Engineering 1 0 0 4 3 2
Health 1 1 1 3 2 2
Industrials 5 5 1 0 1 0
Leisure 2 2 2 2 1 0
Media 2 2 3 2 5 5
Natural Resources 9 6 5 4 3 5
Professional & Support 
Services 1 2 0 0 1 0
Retailing 5 3 3 4 6 6
Technology 0 0 0 1 0 0
Telecoms 1 2 2 2 5 1
Transport 1 5 6 5 2 1
Utilities 1 1 6 4 1 4
Table 5: Industry Classification of Largest 50 Companies7 
 
Headquarters Australia 
– 1998 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand 
– 1998  
New 
Zealand 
– 2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
Australia 47 46 5 7 0 1
New Zealand 2 1 44 41 0 0
United Kingdom 0 0 1 1 47 47
Other 1 3 0 1 2 2
Table 6: Location of Headquarters of Largest 50 Companies 
 
Countries 
Listed  
Australia 
– 1998 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand 
– 1998  
New 
Zealand 
– 2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
New Zealand 0 0 34 30 0 0
New Zealand and 
Australia 8 6 9 16 0 0
New Zealand and Others 0 0 4 3 0 0
New Zealand, Australia 
and UK 0 0 3 1 0 0
Australia 21 31 0 0 0 0
Australia and UK 1 1 0 0 0 0
Australia and Others 20 12 0 0 0 0
UK 0 0 0 0 21 10
UK and Others 0 0 0 0 28 40
Table 7: Countries in which Largest 50 Companies are Listed 
                                                 
7 While most companies do not operate exclusively in one industry, companies were classified into the industry in 
which the majority of their revenue is earned. 
Crombie  Institutionalising the Discourse of Executive Remuneration   39 
 
Financials  Australia 
– 1998 
 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand – 
1998  
New 
Zealand – 
2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
 AU$/US$ AU$/US$ NZ$/US$ NZ$/US$ UK£/US$ UK£/US$ 
Exchange Rate on 31 
December 
0.612 0.878 0.527 0.768 1.663 1.984 
 AU$ 
(000,000) 
AU$ 
(000,000) 
NZ$ 
(000,000) 
NZ$ 
(000,000) 
UK£ 
(000,000) 
UK£ 
(000,000) 
Market Capitalisation 7,9168 
(9,088)9 
23,661 
(25,146) 
2,842 
(7,125) 
5,326 
(13,358) 
19,119 
(20,098) 
27,847 
(29,163) 
Revenue 5,975 
(6,852) 
11,842 
(13,972) 
2,337 
(5,660) 
2,628 
(6,430) 
9,958 
(9,524) 
22,902 
(33,322) 
Net Profit after Tax 394 
(604) 
1,691 
(2,548) 
125 
(575) 
414 
(1,063) 
711 
(572) 
2,227 
(3,222) 
Total Assets 22,601 
(45,069) 
54,184 
(109,239) 
8,913 
(29,784) 
20,171 
(78,825) 
42,522 
(65,831) 
129,845 
(303,381) 
Net Assets 4,065 
(4,822) 
7,959 
(9,000) 
1,672 
(3,566) 
1,896 
(4,642) 
5,716 
(12,176) 
12,186 
(18,457) 
 AU$ AU$ NZ$ NZ$ UK£ UK£ 
Dividend per Share 0.31 
(0.26) 
0.75 
(0.67) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
0.24 
(0.30) 
0.19 
(0.13) 
0.29 
(0.22) 
 Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio 
Return on Assets 4.50% 
(3.77%) 
7.97% 
(7.91%) 
5.78% 
(6.59%) 
8.91% 
(8.15%) 
6.84% 
(6.84%) 
8.10% 
(7.02%) 
Return on Equity 10.99% 
(7.93%) 
22.40% 
(19.89%) 
10.19% 
(14.06%) 
19.83% 
(20.31%) 
23.90% 
(29.11%) 
40.01% 
(83.87) 
Debt-to-equity 3.18 
(4.74) 
4.96 
(8.86) 
2.01 
(3.94) 
2.90 
(8.04) 
7.38 
(10.19) 
8.77 
(15.26) 
Table 8: Financial Statistics of Largest 50 Companies 
                                                 
8 The first number in each box is the average. 
9 The second number (in parentheses) in each box is the standard deviation. 
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Motivation 
 
 
 
Australia                 
Bosch Report 
(1st ed.) 
1991 
1   1 1 3  2      8 
Excesses of the 1980s. 
Bosch Report 
(2nd ed.) 1993 1   1 1 3 1 2      9 
Excesses of the 1980s; Influence of 
Cadbury & US Business Roundtable 
reports; Australian court decisions. 
Hilmer Report 
(1st ed.) 1993             1 1 
Aftermath of the AWA Case; Excesses 
of the 1980s; New management theories; 
Developments in UK. 
Bosch Report 
(3rd ed.) 1995    1 1 3  1      6 
New listing rules & laws; Australian 
court decisions; Overseas developments 
in corporate governance, e.g. General 
Motors guideline (1992), Cadbury report 
(1992), Hong Kong code (1995), etc; 
Influence of institutional investors. 
AIMA (1st ed.) 1995       1       1 --- 
Hilmer Report 
(2nd ed.) 1998             1 1 
Aftermath of the AWA case; Excesses 
of the 1980s; Overseas developments in 
corporate governance, particularly UK. 
IFSA (3rd ed.) 1999       1       1 
Influence of fund managers; The Hoare 
Panel (1994); OECD principles. 
Table 9a: Issuers of Regulations in Australia and Their Stated Motivation (2000-2007)10 
 
                                                 
10 The bolded number indicates the main issuer of the regulation. 
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AICD on ESOS 2001    1          1 Corporations Act 2001. 
Corporations 
Act 2001   1           1 
Doubts about the enforceability of the 
old Corporations Law. 
IFSA (4th ed.) 2002       1       1 
Excesses of 1980s and recent high 
profile collapses 
Horwath Report 2002            1 1 2 
Recent collapses, e.g. HIH, Harris 
Scarfe, Ansett and OneTel.; US Blue 
Ribbon Committee Report (1999) 
ASX Principles 
(1st ed.) 2003 1             1 --- 
AICD on 
Executives 2003    1          1 
Corporations Act and new ASX listing 
rules. 
ASA on 
Executive Pay 2004         1     1 
Concern over growth in executive pay 
levels and relationship to performance. 
CLERP Act  2004   1           
1 High profile corporate collapses; Aim to 
restore confidence to the market. 
IFSA (5th ed.) 2004       1       1 Excesses of the 1980s; CLERP 2004. 
AICD on 
Executive 
Incentives 2007    1     1  1   3 Periodic review of policies 
ASX Principles 
(2nd ed.) 2007 1             1 --- 
Proportional 
Involvement 
(1991-2007)  10% 0% 5% 15% 7% 22% 12% 12% 5% 0% 2% 2% 7% 
 
 
Table 9b: Issuers of Regulations in Australia and Their Stated Motivation (2000-2007) 
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New Zealand                 
NZSE Listing 
Rules (1st ed.) 1994 1             1 --- 
NZSE Listing 
Rules (2nd ed.) 1999 1             1 --- 
NZICA on 
Transparency  2002      1        
1 
Response to US corporate governance 
and auditing crisis, e.g. Enron and 
Arthur Andersen 
NZICA on 
Reporting  2003      1        1 
Response to US accounting scandals, 
e.g. Enron and WorldCom 
NZICA on 
Corporate 
Governance 2003      1        
1 NZICA on Reporting (2003); US crisis 
& Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002); OECD 
principles. 
NZX Listing 
Rules (3rd ed.) 2003 1             
1 
--- 
NZ Securities 
Commission - 
Background & 
Consultant 2003  1            
1 
Initiated by Minister of Commerce; 
Draws on local bodies work (e.g. 
NZICA) and international practice (e.g. 
OECD); US corporate governance crisis. 
NZ Securities 
Commission - 
Principles 2004  1            
1 
Initiated by Minister of Commerce; 
Draws on local bodies work (e.g. 
NZICA) and international practice (e.g. 
OECD); US corporate governance crisis. 
NZSA on CEO 
Pay 2004         1     
1 
Shareholder disquiet 
IOD's Code 2005    1          1 --- 
Proportional 
Involvement  30% 20% 0% 10% 0% 30% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  
Table 10: Issuers of Regulations in New Zealand and Their Stated Motivation 
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Motivation 
 
 
 
United 
Kingdom  
               
Cadbury Report 1992 1 1    1        
3 Corporate scandals, e.g. BBCI & 
Maxwell; Societal perception that 
directors are overpaid; Harsh economic 
climate. 
Greenbury 
Report 1995           1   
1 Perception that directors received too 
many share options when utilities were 
privatised; Golden handshakes; 
Perception that no one is accountability 
for directors’ remuneration. 
Hampel 1998 1   1  1 1 1   1   
6 Cadbury (1992) & Greenbury (1995) 
reports; Corporate scandals. 
Combined Code 
(1st ed.) 1998  1            
1 
Hampel report (1998). 
CIMA Report 2001      1        
1 Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and 
Hampel (1998) reports. 
Combined Code 
(2nd ed.) 2003  1            
1 
Higgs (2003) and Smith (2003) reports. 
Deloitte Report 
(2004) 2004   1          1 2 
Report requested by Department of 
Trade & Industry. 
Combined Code 
(3rd ed.) 2006  1            
1 Biennial review by Financial Reporting 
Council. 
Combined Code 
(4th ed.) 2008 1 1    1        
3 Biennial review by Financial Reporting 
Council. 
Proportional 
Involvement  16% 26% 5% 5% 0% 21% 5% 5% 0% 0% 11% 0% 5% 
  
Table 11: Issuers of Regulations in the UK and Their Stated Motivation 
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Chart 1: Number of Remuneration Logics in Regulations 
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Chart 2: Number of Remuneration Logics in Annual Reports of Companies 
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# of 
Texts 
Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant Total 
UK             
Top50-2007 50 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.44 0.92 1.00 0.36 0.80 0.90 0.96 8.18 
Top50-1998 48 0.90 0.67 0.96 0.27 0.77 0.92 0.14 0.50 0.84 0.69 6.50 
Continuous-2007 49 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.43 0.92 1.00 0.37 0.82 0.90 0.96 8.18 
Continuous-1998 65 0.78 0.62 0.89 0.22 0.52 0.88 0.14 0.43 0.74 0.66 5.88 
             
Regulation-1998to2007 8 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.14 0.43 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.86 0.71 7.43 
Regulation-Pre1998 2 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 6.50 
             
Australia             
Top50-2007 50 0.92 0.90 1.00 0.72 0.90 1.00 0.66 0.88 0.80 0.90 8.68 
Top50-1998 50 0.52 0.22 0.56 0.12 0.22 0.60 0.00 0.18 0.36 0.64 3.42 
Continuous-2007 46 0.93 0.89 1.00 0.74 0.91 1.00 0.63 0.89 0.80 0.91 8.72 
Continuous-1998 48 0.46 0.21 0.58 0.10 0.25 0.56 0.00 0.23 0.33 0.54 3.27 
             
Regulation-1998to2007 5 0.69 0.62 0.69 0.31 0.08 0.54 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.23 5.00 
Regulation-Pre1998 13 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.00 2.40 
             
New Zealand             
Top50-2007 50 0.54 0.34 0.66 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.22 0.30 0.32 0.28 3.58 
Top50-1998 49 0.13 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.88 
Continuous-2007 40 0.60 0.38 0.68 0.28 0.40 0.43 0.25 0.38 0.35 0.35 4.08 
Continuous-1998 45 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.11 1.13 
             
Regulation-1998to2007 10 0.30 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.00 3.00 
Regulation-Pre1998 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 12: Average Use of Remuneration Logics in the Annual Reports of Companies and Regulations 
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Number of 
Remuneration 
Logics 
Australia 
– 1998 
 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand – 
1998  
New 
Zealand – 
2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
0 9 0 35 7 1 0 
1 5 0 3 8 0 0 
2 4 0 2 7 0 1 
3 7 0 2 5 1 0 
4 8 0 3 7 2 0 
5 5 0 2 5 10 0 
6 8 5 0 1 10 2 
7 1 5 0 3 12 11 
8 1 7 0 3 8 16 
9 2 17 1 2 4 13 
10 0 16 0 2 2 7 
Total 50 50 48 50 49 50 
Table 13: Number of Remuneration Logics per Company for Largest 50 Companies 
 
 Australia New Zealand United Kingdom 
 1998 2007 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 
Human Resources 0.500 0.929 *** 0.108 0.622 *** 0.871 0.936  
Agency 0.238 0.905 *** 0.135 0.405 ** 0.613 0.839 * 
Pay for Performance 0.571 1.000 *** 0.270 0.676 *** 0.871 0.936  
Contribution 0.119 0.738 *** 0.108 0.297 * 0.226 0.419  
Achievement 0.293 0.905 *** 0.162 0.405 * 0.586 0.936 ** 
Market 0.595 1.000 *** 0.081 0.432 *** 0.936 1.000  
Fairness 0.000 0.592 *** 0.000 0.243 ** 0.129 0.387 * 
Appropriate 0.268 0.905 *** 0.081 0.405 ** 0.517 0.774 * 
Motivation 0.381 0.810 *** 0.108 0.378 ** 0.807 0.871  
Consultant 0.571 0.905 *** 0.108 0.351 * 0.645 0.968 ** 
Total Remuneration 
Logics 
3.524 8.691 *** 1.162 4.216 *** 6.129 8.065 *** 
Number of 
Continuously Listed 
Companies11 
42 37 31 
Table 14: Difference between Means of Continuously Listed Companies12 
 
                                                 
11 The number of continuously listed companies has been reduced to those companies that have not changed 
significantly between 1998 and 2007, e.g. no major mergers or acquisitions.  
12 Key: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.220 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
*0.358 0.276 1.000        
Contribution 0.108 **0.547 0.203 1.000       
Achievement 0.071 0.267 **0.404 0.225 1.000      
Market **0.441 **0.434 **0.674 0.176 **0.363 1.000     
Fairness       1.000    
Appropriate *0.346 0.128 0.206 **0.468 0.102 0.170  1.000   
Motivation **0.637 0.205 *0.329 0.108 0.164 *0.357  *0.299 1.000  
Consultant **0.364 **0.398 0.259 0.277 0.226 **0.493  0.134 *0.302 1.000 
Table 15: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for Australian Companies in 199813 
 
 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.147 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
  1.000        
Contribution 0.144 0.238  1.000       
Achievement **0.393 0.111  0.238 1.000      
Market      1.000     
Fairness -0.056 0.042  0.023 -0.099  1.000    
Appropriate 0.118 0.082  0.181 0.082  0.125 1.000   
Motivation 0.221 *0.333  -0.089 0.000  -0.042 -0.185 1.000  
Consultant **0.393 0.111  -0.059 **0.556  -0.099 0.082 0.167 1.000 
Table 16: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for Australian Companies in 2007 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Key: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency **0.423 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
**0.543 **0.474 1.000        
Contribution *0.342 **0.545 **0.374 1.000       
Achievement **0.429 **0.423 **0.693 *0.342 1.000      
Market **0.810 **0.423 **0.393 **0.570 0.238 1.000     
Fairness       1.000    
Appropriate **0.552 **0.377 0.134 *0.314 0.236 **0.552  1.000   
Motivation **0.423 **0.644 **0.474 0.234 **0.683 0.163  **0.377 1.000  
Consultant **0.423 **0.644 **0.474 0.234 **0.423 **0.423  **0.377 **0.644 1.000 
Table 17: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for New Zealand Companies in 1998 
  
 
 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency *0.324 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
0.185 *0.337 1.000        
Contribution **0.490 **0.434 0.177 1.000       
Achievement **0.461 **0.413 **0.402 **0.567 1.000      
Market **0.640 0.221 0.214 **0.479 **0.523 1.000     
Fairness *0.296 0.128 0.177 0.068 0.153 **0.380 1.000    
Appropriate *0.342 0.175 *0.286 *0.284 **0.487 **0.387 0.179 1.000   
Motivation **0.633 *0.322 0.040 *0.360 0.265 **0.523 0.257 **0.393 1.000  
Consultant **0.397 0.117 0.260 *0.314 0.241 **0.429 0.099 **0.369 0.145 1.000 
Table 18: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for New Zealand Companies in 2007 
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 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.053 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
-0.070 0.076 1.000        
Contribution 0.050 0.024 -0.110 1.000       
Achievement -0.020 0.043 0.136 -0.009 1.000      
Market -0.101 0.269 *0.315 0.010 0.197 1.000     
Fairness -0.055 *0.284 0.084 0.151 0.220 0.122 1.000    
Appropriate -0.061 0.188 0.211 0.219 0.060 0.006 0.167 1.000   
Motivation **0.398 -0.072 -0.091 0.140 0.027 -0.132 0.023 -0.101 1.000  
Consultant 0.069 0.010 -0.137 *0.299 -0.039 -0.036 -0.108 0.058 0.066 1.000 
Table 19: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for UK Companies in 1998 
  
 
 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.239 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
**0.479 0.239 1.000        
Contribution 0.181 0.079 0.181 1.000       
Achievement *0.316 0.118 *0.316 0.261 1.000      
Market      1.000     
Fairness -0.060 -0.108 -0.060 0.091 0.068  1.000    
Appropriate **0.408 -0.031 0.153 0.040 0.221  0.271 1.000   
Motivation 0.272 0.082 0.272 0.027 0.147  -0.028 0.000 1.000  
Consultant **0.479 0.239 **0.479 0.181 *0.316  -0.060 0.153 0.272 1.000 
Table 20: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for UK Companies in 2007 
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 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources 0.039 0.119 0.066 0.109 -0.013 0.248 -0.087 0.109 0.205 
Agency 0.101 -0.039 -0.121 0.105 0.074 0.218 -0.006 -0.015 0.054 
Pay for Performance *0.330 *0.313 0.111 **0.374 *0.296 0.268 -0.182 -0.056 *0.282 
Contribution 0.205 0.150 -0.174 0.250 0.136 **0.377 -0.173 0.006 0.236 
Achievement 0.219 0.214 0.253 0.257 0.194 *0.291 0.120 0.231 *0.279 
Market 0.174 0.237 0.052 0.244 0.127 0.189 -0.117 -0.028 0.254 
Fairness          
Appropriate 0.205 0.088 0.233 0.203 0.079 **0.390 0.088 *0.349 0.251 
Motivation 0.046 0.014 0.029 0.125 0.073 *0.331 -0.050 0.056 0.171 
Consultant 0.032 0.154 -0.103 0.150 0.006 0.233 -0.204 -0.023 0.185 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.236 0.229 0.068 *0.324 0.173 **0.446 -0.116 0.104 *0.343 
Table 21: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for Australian Companies in 199814 
 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources 0.255 *0.352 *0.317 0.080 0.024 0.042 0.077 0.131 0.106 
Agency -0.010 0.032 -0.056 -0.011 -0.055 -0.160 0.019 0.028 0.090 
Pay for Performance          
Contribution 0.188 0.140 0.150 *0.309 0.157 0.091 -0.137 0.012 0.252 
Achievement -0.006 -0.022 -0.132 -0.014 -0.153 0.055 -0.077 0.003 0.129 
Market          
Fairness 0.063 -0.082 -0.017 -0.164 -0.123 -0.018 -0.073 -0.146 -0.020 
Appropriate 0.121 -0.017 0.225 0.078 -0.004 0.221 0.086 0.129 0.135 
Motivation 0.136 0.182 -0.021 0.034 0.058 0.071 0.117 0.119 0.049 
Consultant 0.210 0.092 -0.079 0.158 0.050 0.174 *-0.336 *-0.322 0.141 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.261 0.169 0.101 0.126 -0.006 0.129 -0.092 -0.020 0.236 
Table 22: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for Australian Companies in 2007 
                                                 
14 Key: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources **0.440 *0.346 0.039 **0.461 **0.380 0.246 0.028 0.0362 **0.384 
Agency 0.241 *0.308 ***-0.512 *0.354 *0.336 0.039 *-0.328 *-0.286 0.055 
Pay for Performance ***0.714 ***0.642 0.108 ***0.677 ***0.628 0.248 -0.170 0.055 *0.289 
Contribution *0.336 0.258 -0.086 0.279 0.262 0.155 0.021 0.113 0.029 
Achievement ***0.568 **0.457 0.176 ***0.511 ***0.516 *0.359 -0.091 0.080 0.173 
Market *0.285 0.203 -0.040 0.276 0.251 -0.011 0.071 0.045 0.133 
Fairness          
Appropriate -0.082 -0.120 0.036 -0.138 -0.145 0.090 *0.343 0.222 -0.050 
Motivation 0.222 0.283 -0.111 *0.368 *0.298 *0.362 *-0.310 -0.175 *0.303 
Consultant 0.149 0.239 -0.149 *0.317 0.256 0.005 *-0.310 -0.200 0.198 
Total Remuneration Logics ***0.510 **0.455 -0.053 ***0.534 **0.483 0.240 -0.120 0.000 0.258 
Table 23: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for New Zealand Companies in 1998 
 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources **0.463 ***0.565 **0.458 **0.378 *0.334 0.273 0.111 *0.297 0.218 
Agency **0.426 *0.348 **0.454 **0.366 **0.398 0.172 0.103 0.244 0.192 
Pay for Performance **0.392 *0.326 *0.356 **0.381 **0.407 0.261 -0.007 0.051 0.146 
Contribution ***0.603 ***0.664 ***0.535 ***0.616 ***0.558 ***0.550 -0.009 0.271 **0.412 
Achievement ***0.672 ***0.712 ***0.494 ***0.648 ***0.632 *0.368 -0.099 0.148 *0.322 
Market ***0.572 ***0.614 **0.473 ***0.583 ***0.494 *0.295 -0.139 0.209 *0.331 
Fairness **0.409 *0.290 *0.350 **0.401 *0.352 0.171 -0.221 0.019 *0.333 
Appropriate **0.455 ***0.536 *0.350 **0.396 *0.296 **0.399 0.113 *0.312 *0.350 
Motivation **0.409 ***0.488 **0.453 *0.308 0.250 0.169 0.225 **0.449 0.240 
Consultant **0.369 **0.392 *0.300 *0.302 0.193 **0.450 -0.038 0.084 *0.354 
Total Remuneration Logics ***0.762 ***0.791 ***0.676 ***0.698 ***0.623 ***0.504 0.011 *0.337 **0.458 
Table 24: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for New Zealand Companies in 2007 
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 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources -0.192 -0.093 -0.086 0.008 -0.054 -0.067 -0.009 -0.068 0.020 
Agency *0.330 0.106 0.005 0.144 0.115 0.152 -0.110 0.202 0.100 
Pay for Performance -0.034 0.174 0.009 0.191 0.044 0.128 -0.193 -0.137 0.084 
Contribution 0.105 -0.101 0.096 0.029 0.137 *0.339 0.000 -0.042 -0.080 
Achievement -0.029 0.207 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.250 0.117 -0.042 -0.130 
Market 0.235 *0.282 0.093 *0.307 0.125 0.092 -0.126 *-0.333 0.014 
Fairness 0.102 0.146 0.185 0.196 0.147 *0.317 0.015 0.016 0.128 
Appropriate 0.087 0.058 -0.135 0.203 0.072 0.258 *-0.300 -0.013 0.134 
Motivation -0.148 -0.086 -0.098 -0.043 -0.122 -0.092 0.089 0.062 -0.084 
Consultant 0.061 -0.224 -0.053 -0.011 -0.170 0.132 0.082 0.093 0.166 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.195 0.098 -0.005 0.264 0.089 **0.428 -0.151 -0.137 0.089 
Table 25: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for UK Companies in 1998 
 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources 0.258 0.254 0.061 0.227 0.104 0.015 -0.187 0.051 0.111 
Agency 0.200 0.245 -0.013 *0.287 0.253 -0.120 **-0.373 -0.066 0.125 
Pay for Performance 0.069 0.176 -0.007 0.186 0.098 0.011 *-0.286 0.019 0.101 
Contribution -0.179 -0.098 0.056 -0.045 -0.230 0.094 -0.084 0.168 0.210 
Achievement 0.028 0.135 -0.053 -0.044 0.004 -0.052 -0.081 0.045 -0.075 
Market          
Fairness -0.158 -0.037 0.021 -0.122 -0.167 -0.045 0.041 0.167 0.109 
Appropriate *0.322 0.235 0.023 0.131 0.104 0.122 -0.021 0.095 0.039 
Motivation -0.178 -0.169 -0.124 -0.042 -0.066 0.059 -0.193 0.010 0.007 
Consultant -0.119 -0.080 -0.104 0.045 -0.110 -0.185 *-0.312 0.028 0.109 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.017 0.116 -0.013 0.096 -0.051 0.004 -0.276 0.153 0.184 
Table 26: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for UK Companies in 2007 
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 Australia – 1998 Australia – 2007 New Zealand – 1998 New Zealand – 2007 United Kingdom – 
1998 
United Kingdom – 2007 
 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 
Human 
Resources 
0.524 0.517  0.871 1.000  0.031 0.313 ** 0.333 0.850 *** 0.905 0.893  1.000 0.950  
Agency 0.191 0.241  0.871 0.947  0.000 0.188 * 0.233 0.500  0.571 0.750  0.800 0.900  
Pay for 
Performance 
0.476 0.621  1.000 1.000  0.031 0.625 *** 0.567 0.800  0.952 0.964  1.000 0.950  
Contribution 0.095 0.138  0.645 0.842  0.031 0.188  0.100 0.400 * 0.095 0.393 * 0.500 0.425  
Achievement 0.143 0.310  0.903 0.895  0.000 0.375 *** 0.067 0.700 *** 0.810 0.750  0.900 0.925  
Market 0.571 0.621  1.000 1.000  0.063 0.250  0.100 0.800 *** 0.905 0.929  1.000 1.000  
Fairness 0.000 0.000  0.677 0.632  0.000 0.000  0.100 0.400 * 0.048 0.214  0.200 0.400  
Appropriate 0.191 0.172  0.871 0.895  0.031 0.063  0.133 0.550 ** 0.429 0.571  0.600 0.850  
Motivation 0.476 0.276  0.774 0.842  0.000 0.188 * 0.133 0.600 *** 0.857 0.821  1.000 0.875  
Consultant 0.667 0.621  0.903 0.895  0.000 0.188 * 0.167 0.450 * 0.714 0.679  1.000 0.950  
Total 
Remuneration 
Logics 
3.333 3.512  8.516 8.947  0.177 2.375 *** 1.933 6.050 *** 6.191 6.724  8.00 8.225  
Market 
Capitalisation  
$5.1915 $9.89  $15.82 $36.45 ** $0.43 $7.96 *** $0.83 $12.08 ** £13.87 £22.92  £15.14 £31.02  
Revenue $3.49 $7.77 * $6.25 $20.97 *** $0.32 $6.61 *** $0.43 $5.92 ** £9.19 £10.52  £15.53 £24.74  
Net Profit 
after Tax 
$0.18 $0.55 * $0.91 $2.96 ** $0.02 $0.35  $0.05 $0.96 ** £0.65 £0.76  £1.38 £2.44  
Total Assets $16.83 $29.39  $35.73 $99.70  $0.48 $28.77 ** $1.01 $55.29 * £52.03 £37.35  £106.05 £158.75  
Net Assets $2.53 $5.41  $6.15 $12.70 * $0.24 $5.05 *** $0.54 $4.19 ** £3.61 £5.40  £6.84 £14.67  
Dividend per 
Share 
$0.31 $0.30  $0.85 $0.63  $0.16 $0.21  $0.19 $0.36  £0.20 £0.21  £0.29 £0.30  
Return on 
Assets 
5.3% 3.9%  7.1% 9.4%  6.8% 3.7%  9.3% 8.32%  6.5% 7.1%  7.3% 8.3%  
Return on 
Equity 
12.6% 9.8%  17.8% 29.9% * 10.4% 9.8%  15.8% 25.9%  29.3% 19.8%  23.4% 44.2%  
Debt-to-
Equity Ratio 
3.39 3.03  3.43 7.44  1.52 3.07  1.03 5.70 * 11.26 5.33  9.88 8.49  
Number of 
Companies 
21 29  31 19  34 16  30 20  21 28  10 40  
Table 27: Differences between Means of Companies Listed in One Country and Multiple Countries 
                                                 
15 Monetary figures are quoted in local currency (Australian dollars, New Zealand dollars and UK pounds) and in billions (except dividend per share). 
